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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 44682
)
v. ) FREMONT COUNTY NO. CR 2016-274
)
TIMOTHY RAY GREENE, ) APPELLANT'S
) REPLY BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Timothy Greene contends the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing
his sentence pursuant to his I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for leniency because it did
not, as required by statute, consider his mental health issues in making that decision.  The State
mistakenly believes that this challenge is not properly raised in this appeal and that the district
court’s underlying conclusion – that Mr. Greene does not suffer from a substantial mental illness
and  is  not  in  need  of  treatment  –  was  appropriate.   That  latter  point  is  directly  contrary  to  the
evidence in the record, notably the psychosexual evaluation’s specific diagnosis of three
substantial mental illnesses.  The former point fails to appreciate the proper standard reviewing
2decisions  on  Rule  35  motions.   Therefore,  the  State’s  arguments  are  meritless.   As  such,  this
Court should either reduce Mr. Greene’s sentences as it deems appropriate or remand this case
for further reduction of his sentence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Greene’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing Mr. Greene’s sentence
when it granted his Rule 35 motion.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Further Reducing Mr. Greene’s Sentence When
It Granted His Rule 35 Motion
A. Mr.  Greene’s  Challenge  To  The  District  Court’s  Decision  To  Not  Further  Reduce  His
Sentence In Light Of Its Failure To Consider His Mental Health Issues As Required By
Statute Is Properly Raised On This Appeal
When making a request for leniency under Rule 35, the defendant must present new or
additional evidence which demonstrates that the originally imposed sentence was unduly severe.
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  When reviewing a sentence which was amended
following such a showing, the appellate court considers the length of the new term of sentence.
State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14 (Ct. App. 2008).  The standards for determining whether the
new term of sentence is appropriate “are the same as those applied in determining whether the
original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  Thus, a
3sentence amended pursuant to Rule 35 will be deemed unreasonable if the district court fails to
sufficiently consider all the relevant mitigating factors in the record in deciding how to amend
the sentence. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing a sentence
because the district court failed to sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in that case);
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008) (same).
In  this  case,  the  district  court  determined  that,  based  on  Mr.  Greene’s  statements  at  the
hearing on his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Greene met his burden to show the sentence as originally
imposed was unduly severe.  (Tr., p.112.)  Therefore, it amended his sentence.  (See R., p.176.)
However, in deciding what his amended sentence should be (i.e., how much to reduce the unduly
severe original sentence), the district court failed to act in accordance with the applicable legal
standards or reach its decision in an exercise of reason. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600
(1989) (explaining that a district court abuses its discretion by not recognizing the issue as one of
discretion, by acting beyond the outer bounds of that discretion or inconsistent with the
applicable legal standards, or by not reaching its decision in an exercise of reason).  As such,
Mr.  Greene  challenged  that  decision  on  appeal  as  constituting  an  abuse  of  the  district  court’s
discretion.  (App. Br., pp.6-7.)
Specifically, he argued that the district court failed to consider his mental health issues as
required by statute. See I.C. § 19-2523 (providing that, when the defendant’s mental health is a
significant factor, the court shall consider such factors as” the nature of the illness, the prognosis
for rehabilitation, and the availability of treatment options).1  Furthermore, he argued that, since
the district court had not changed its view of that factor, its decision as to the length of the
1 The use of term like “must” and “shall” in a statute establishes a mandatory duty to act in a
certain manner, whereas “may” would permit, but not require, the prescribed action. Rangen,
Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 160 Idaho 251, 256 (2016).
4amended sentence must have been made in light of the way the district court viewed that issue
when it initially imposed his sentence.  To that point, Mr. Greene explained that, when the
district court initially imposed his sentence, it had made a clearly-erroneous finding that he did
not suffer from any mental health issues.  (See Section B, infra.)  Therefore, even though his
argument challenging the decision on his Rule 35 motion refers to this fact which occurred
during the initial sentencing hearing, that argument is appropriately considered as part of the
review of whether the sentence as amended is appropriate and entered pursuant to a valid
exercise of the district court’s discretion.
B. The  District  Court’s  Conclusion  About  The  Presence  Of  Mental  Health  Issues  In  This
Case Was Unsupported By Any Of The Evaluations In The Record
The State’s argument – that the district court’s conclusion about Mr. Greene not suffering
from  a  substantial  mental  health  issue  is  properly  based  on  statements  made  within  the  DHW
report (Resp. Br., p.4) – misrepresents or ignores the facts in the record.  First, it completely fails
to recognize that,  in the psychosexual evaluation conducted after the DHW report  was written,
Dr. Gayle Snowden actually diagnosed Mr. Greene with three distinct, substantial mental
illnesses:  major depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and alcohol neurocognitive disorder.
(PSI, p.131.)  Therefore, regardless of what the DHW report’s conclusions about Mr. Greene’s
mental  health  issues,  this  subsequent  diagnosis  reveals  that  the  district  court’s  conclusion  (that
Mr. Greene does not suffer from a substantial mental illness) is clearly erroneous.
Second, the State’s argument misrepresents what the DHW report actually says.  The
State believes that there is a sufficient basis to support the district court’s conclusion because the
DHW author marked “No” in regard to the question “GAIN assessment and/or other resources as
noted above indicate that a serious mental illness (SMI) may be present?”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)
5However, the DHW author had seventeen such questions to answer as part of his evaluation, and
he answered “Yes” to over half of them.  (PSI, pp.89-90.)  As such, the answer to one of those
seventeen  questions  does  not  represent  a  valid  basis  to  support  the  district  court’s  conclusion.
See, e.g., Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003) (explaining that “[e]vidence is
substantial and competent if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it”).  Besides, at
the end of his report, the DHW author expressly stated his conclusions:  “Summary of findings
for the DHW § 19-2524 review of MH based on the GAIN/GRRS and other collateral
information as noted: Timothy Greene presents with SMI or other MH needs. . . .”  (R., p.90
(emphasis added).)  As such, the State’s argument – that the district court’s conclusion to the
contrary is somehow justified by the DHW report – is, quite simply, wrong in light of all the
information in the record.
In fact, the record indicates the answer upon which the State relies is actually a
typographical error because just above that answer on the form, the DHW author had noted that
the GAIN assessment had provided “rule out” diagnoses for “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,
Acute Stress Disorder, or other disorder of extreme stress”; of a “mood disorder [not otherwise
specified]”; and alcohol dependence.  (See PSI, p.89; see PSI, p.75 (the GAIN assessment
providing those rule out diagnoses.)  The DHW author explained that a “rule out” diagnosis is a
“provisional” diagnosis given when the GAIN author is not a licensed mental health clinician,
but the GAIN process has identified symptoms consistent with a mental health issue.  (PSI, p.89)
As such, the GAIN expressly indicated at least two serious mental illnesses which may have
been present in Mr. Greene’s case by making those rule out diagnoses.  Ergo, the answer in the
DHW upon which the State relies, which is directly contrary to all the evidence in the record, is
6not the sort of substantial, competent evidence upon which a reasonable finder of fact would
rely.
As such, a proper understanding of the record reveals the district court’s error in the Rule
35  context.   The  district  court  determined  that  Mr.  Greene’s  statements  at  the  Rule  35  hearing
showed his initial sentence was unduly severe due, in part, to his mental state at the time of the
offense.  (Tr., p.112.)  The mental health issues identified in the presentence evaluations would
have also affected his mental state at the time.  Therefore, the district court was statutorily-
obligated to consider those mental health issues in deciding what sentence was appropriate. See
I.C. § 19-2523.  The district court did not consider Mr. Greene’s mental health issues in its
decision  on  the  Rule  35  motion.   (See generally R.; Tr.)  Thus, it did not make its decision
consistent with the applicable legal standards.
And, since it did not make a new finding of fact about that issue, its decision must have
been made in light of its pervious, clearly erroneous, conclusion that those issues did not exist.
Since the district court’s decision about the length of the amended sentence was premised on that
clearly erroneous finding of fact, its decision to not further reduce his sentence was not made in
an exercise of reason. See, e.g., Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90.  For both
those reasons, the district court abused its discretion in ruling on Mr. Greene’s Rule 35 motion
by not further reducing his sentence.
7CONCLUSION
Mr. Greene respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for further
reduction of his sentence.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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